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China’s Global Order: a New Paradigm 
in South to South Relations
Ernani Contipelli, Simona Picciau
“To win one hundred victories in one hundred battles 
is not the acme of skill. To subdue the enemy without 
fighting is the acme of skill” (Sun Tsu, The Art of War) 
Abstract
This article analyses the evolution of Chinese political foreign policy and its strategy in approaching 
developing and less developed nations. In this context, the relationship between China and Latin 
America appears to reveal the practice of the Beijing Consensus when considering their interests: 
China needs natural resources and new markets for its products, and Latin America needs financial 
aid and loans to develop its infrastructure and provide social programmes. The absence of the 
US in the region and the rise of political movements denouncing the American imperialism of the 
Washington Consensus are all factors that contribute to the expansion of Chinese influence. All these 
considerations allow a discussion concerning the new role of China in developing countries as an 
expression of a new emerging order in which China is assuming an important role.
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Introduction
China has confirmed itself as one of the most powerful countries in the 
world, creating its own model of development and promoting a new form 
of South to South relations. China has passed a period of self-isolation 
and ideological foreign policy to enter a period where it becomes a 
central player in the current global system, through a strategy based on 
pragmatism and economic interests.
China has created its own form of governance based on the idea of 
the “Chinese socialism market” and seeks new partners to sustain its 
wide economic growth. Through the concept of the Beijing Consensus, 
founded on innovation, diversification and self-determination, Chinese 
foreign policy has been able to turn itself into an alternative and essential 
partner for developing and less developed countries. 
This article analyses the evolution of Chinese political foreign policy and 
its strategy in approaching developing and less developed nations. In this 
context, the relations between China and Latin America are considered, 
to reveal the practice of the Beijing Consensus when considering 
their interests: China needs natural resources and new markets for its 
products, while Latin America needs financial aid and loans to develop 
its infrastructure and provide social programmes. The absence of the 
influence of the US in the region and the rise of political movements 
denouncing the American imperialism of the Washington Consensus 
are factors that contribute to the expansion of Chinese influence in Latin 
America. The role of China in developing countries as a new South to 
South relationship is thus to be discussed.
Rise of the Asiatic Dragon
The role of China on the global scene is becoming increasingly important 
in each corner of the world. In less than three decades, China has been 
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transformed from an agrarian country into the world’s second largest 
economy, becoming one of the most relevant players in the world 
economic system. China has been able to create a powerful network of 
South to South cooperation based on trade investments, manufacturing 
and commodity markets. 
China has emerged since the 1980s as a key partner for developed 
countries and emerging powers due to the economic reforms promoted 
by Deng Xiaoping, the leader of the country after Mao Zedong’s death. 
Partnerships situated not only in Asia but also in Africa and Latin America 
have brought China a host of new opportunities. 
Chinese economic reforms have followed a different path from those 
of other countries that liberalized their markets in the 1980s and 1990s in 
accordance with the IMF and World Bank. These organisations suggested 
reform policies based on privatisation, deregulation, unilateral trade and 
conditional investments. China promoted its process of economic reforms 
differently: lowering barriers, opening its markets and giving business 
opportunities to private agents, under state control and with the direct 
involvement of the Communist Chinese Party (CCP) in the economy. 
Notoriously, the Chinese government controls the economy by planning 
and identifying priorities in the selection of sectors for investment and 
infrastructure, the creation of human capital, research and strategic 
fields. This reflects the strong influence of the CCP in the development of 
the country. The government wanted to create a free area for foreign 
investment by establishing special economic zones. This has become the 
engine of the Chinese economy as an important place for technology 
and import practices on the mainland. In order to restore Hong Kong to the 
People’s Republic of China (PRC) and benefit from its already developed 
economy, China established a constitutional principle that was also valid 
for Macau: One Country, Two Systems. According to this principle these 
two territories could maintain their political system and capitalist economy 
while China maintained its own “socialist market system”.
According to Chinese values the notion of the state is completely different 
from that of Western values. The state is considered the representative of 
Chinese civilization, playing partly a spiritual role for society that gives it 
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authority and legitimacy without challenging power (Jacques 2009). The 
relationship between society and the CCP, for example, has a specific 
dynamic with an implicit agreement wherein people renounce political 
liberties in exchange for the right to enrich themselves, “To get rich is 
glorious!” said Deng Xiaoping.
The Chinese consider the state an intimate community, as the patriarch 
of the family. In Western countries, state power is repeatedly challenged, 
and society almost always perceives this figure as an intruder. This sort 
of view explains the participation of the Chinese state in the economy, 
controlling and intervening in the private sector to confirm its legitimacy 
and authority, as well as the particular path of its political system.
To reach its actual level of economic development, China passed 
through a stage of isolation following the Maoist project of development, 
with a foreign policy based exclusively on ideological motivation in order 
to spread its political model to the revolutionary movements of the “Third 
World countries”. The foreign policy principles formulated in that time, 
around the 1950s continue to influence China’s behaviour towards less-
developed-countries today. This foreign policy includes: 1) mutual respect 
for territorial integrity, 2) non-aggression, 3) mutual non-interference in the 
internal affairs of states, 4) equality and mutual benefit, and 5) peaceful 
coexistence.
During the 1980s and 1990s, China experimented with the beginning 
of its political and economic transformation, starting with the policy of 
four modernizations: agriculture, science and technology, industry and 
defence. These policies were idealised by Zhou Enlai and launched after 
his death by Deng Xiaoping who introduced policies oriented to attracting 
foreign direct investments and stimulating the economic development of 
the country. This would also lead to a new phase of relations between 
China and southern nations in economic and pragmatic interests, 
especially in the supply of natural energy resources to support its growth. 
International admiration for the spectacular Chinese development was 
interrupted by the Tiananmen Square protest at the end of the 1980s. The 
government repressed students who were asking for a fifth modernization, 
democracy and greater political liberty, taking advantage of the 
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visit of the Russian leader Mikhail Gorbachev and the presence of the 
international media. When Western countries opted for international 
isolation and embargo, China began intensifying its relationships with 
developing countries.
The economic and financial crisis that took place in 2008 deeply affected 
the USA and Europe and allowed China to enhance its relationship with 
developing countries, especially Africa and Latin America, in order to 
stimulate the domestic market and diversify exports. These countries 
represent an alternative to the traditional powers (United States, Europe 
and Japan), and a model of economic development. In other words, 
China wanted to establish a new path for relationships with these countries, 
based on economic and pragmatic interests rather than ideological or 
geopolitical factors.
Currently, one of the channels that China is using to act globally and 
also regionally is through a group of countries formed by Brazil, Russia, 
India, China and South Africa (BRICS), which are considered the future 
dominant nations of the world economy1. BRICS were initially created as a 
forum to discuss common interests and homogeneous political strategies 
in traditional international organisations through annual summits between 
its leaders. BRICS has been converted to an “institutional agency” with 
the launch of the New Development Bank and the Contingency Reserve 
Agreement to provide financial aid to developing countries. Through this 
channel, China wants to demonstrate its engagement and support for 
multilateral cooperation on one hand, and on the other hand to move 
away its image as an imperialist and a dominant country, especially in 
East Asia.
Dragon’s Profile: Beijing’s Consensus
As opposed to Latin America and Africa, which followed the 
recommendations of financial institutions such as the IMF and World 
Bank, China chose its own path to increasing its social and economic 
development, centring its efforts on the “open door policy”, creating 
innovation and increasing state control with a set of principles which 
1 According to the report of investment bank Goldman Sachs “Dreaming with BRICs: The Path to 2050” of 2003, the 
economies of Brazil, Russia, India and China could together become larger than those of the G6 (Britain, the United 
States, Germany, Japan, Italy and France) in less than 40 years.
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founded the “Chinese socialist market economy”. In Western perceptions, 
this political formula seems contradictory in itself, but for the Chinese it is 
not, as Deng Xiaoping stated in 1981: “I think there are more than 100 kinds 
of socialism in the world, there is no restriction. China will build socialism 
with Chinese characteristics”. 
The 16th Congress Party, which took place in 2002, ratified the social 
political theory of the three representatives as created by former leader 
Jiang Zemin. According to this theory the CCP should represent advanced 
forces of social production, advanced culture and the interests of the 
overwhelming majority. With this political arrangement, the CCP wanted 
to open itself to the productive forces of the country, managers and 
businessmen, in order to consolidate its hegemony in society, revealing 
the pragmatic approach of Chinese socialism and the will to establish its 
own path of thinking even if it didn’t match Western conceptions.
Even today the current leader, Xi Jinping, explains the Chinese way of 
government using traditional metaphor: “You know if the shoe fits only 
after you put it on yourself” (Lee 2015) meaning that each nation must 
look for the political model that best fits its social and cultural expectations 
of development.
This specific form of governance has shaped the political and economic 
“Dragon’s Profile” creating a new form of “socialism” or “capitalism”, 
depending on the perspective taken. According to its leaders, Chinese 
society is based on certain principles such as reciprocity and harmony, 
repurposed in foreign policy strategy towards less developed countries. 
In particular, as stated by Hu Jintao, China foreign policy aims to “1) 
strengthen strategic common ground and enhance mutual political 
trust; 2) take practical and creative steps to tap potential economic 
cooperation, and 3) attach importance to cultural exchanges to deepen 
mutual understanding” (Shixue 2006). This demonstrates that the country 
wants to enhance its image on the global stage and present itself as a 
good partner.
In 2004 Joshua Ramo introduced the concept of the Beijing Consensus in 
opposition to the Washington Consensus, to express China’s own model 
of development based on three main characteristics: a) innovation: 
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“constant tinkering and constant change, and a recognition that 
different strategies are appropriate for different situations” (Leonard 
2006); b) pursuit of dynamic goals: “rejection of per capita GDP as the 
be-all and end all” balancing with other focuses such as quality of life and 
individual equity; and c) self-determination: “valuing independence and 
self-determination and refusing to let other powers impose their will (…) 
Countries can plan their own development without having to accept the 
unfavourable terms of the Washington Consensus” (Gresh 2008). 
The “recommendations” of the Western capitalist system were followed 
by governments in Latin America, Asia and Africa, especially during the 
1990s. These recommendations were based on the neoliberal ideology 
expressed in the concept of the Washington Consensus. The package 
of policies ofthe Washington Consensus includes free trade agreements, 
fiscal disciplines and the privatisation of state-owned companies, and 
clearly demonstrates a unilateral agenda oriented only by the economic 
and political interests of the North imposed on the South2.
Developing nations pursued features of the Beijing Consensus to create 
their own path and space in the world economic system, resisting the 
dominant economic policy dictated by the Western international financial 
institutions such as the World Bank and IMF. In other words, Beijing’s 
Consensus was to be a lesson to enable developing nations to establish 
their own path of development according to their challenges: “China is 
writing its own book now. The book represents a fusion of Chinese thinking 
with lessons learned from the failure of globalization culture in other 
places. The rest of the world has begun to study this book” (Ramo 2004).
In this context, the success of the Beijing Consensus in its rhetoric of 
reciprocity and harmony, as supporting the growth of the Chinese 
economy, convinced Latin American and African governments to follow 
China’s approach. The financial crisis that affected the USA and Europe 
from 2008 was the decisive factor that allowed a new peripheral network 
of economic relations from South to South, establishing China as the centre.
2 According to Willianson (2004), the Washington Consensus recommendations are based on: fiscal discipline, 
restructuring public/social expenditure priorities, tax reform, liberalising interest rates, competitive exchange rates, 
trade liberalisation, liberalisation of inward foreign investments, privatisation, deregulation and property rights. These 
policies show the neoliberal orientation of the Washington Consensus and its main preoccupation for the growth of 
the GDP and openness of national markets. It has been interpreted as a new form of imperialism founded on the 
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China presented itself as a new pole of opportunities and advantages for 
developing and less developed nations in South America and Africa. Both 
continents can offer their commodities to sustain the increasing economy 
of the Asiatic Dragon and gain unconditional financial aid in exchange. The 
aid and loans support their social policies and infrastructure programmes. 
The dynamics of these relationships reveals the real content of the Beijing 
Consensus and the pragmatic interest that China has in these countries. 
One example of this formula of cooperation is given by Niall Ferguson who 
reported the confirmation of a Chinese leader concerning China´s foreign 
policy strategy in Africa: “we will build up roads, and certain facilities for 
you, but you make sure that we will have access to the commodities and 
primary resources. As to your domestic politics and human rights you do 
whatever that you like” (Ferguson 2010).
International Cooperation under the Wings of China
China is very quickly imposing itself as a source of finance for southern 
nations building critical infrastructure which will reduce obstacles to 
development. These infrastructure projects in Latin America and Africa 
are closely related to China’s economic interests and focus on strategic 
sectors such as energy, mining, transport and telecommunications. 
This infrastructure is considered necessary to increase China’s trade 
relationships and influence in these regions. 
Possible evidence can be seen in the recent Chinese investment strategy 
in Africa: “…roads and bridges in Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), 
railways in Angola and power stations in Zambia which are often planned 
around oil and mineral resources. China is constructing high-voltage 
power transmission lines to interconnect countries in Southern Africa. In 
the rail sector China’s largest deals include the construction of mass transit 
systems as in Nigeria, and the construction of new lines linked to mining 
developments in Gabon and Mauritania” (Schiere, Rugamba 2011). 
When building these infrastructure projects China uses its own labour 
force which interrupts the generation of local employment. China also 
tries to obtain privileges in licenses and regulations to exploit the natural 
resources of these countries.
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This particular Chinese approach demonstrates the real content of the 
Beijing’s Consensus. The pragmatism represents the backbone of the 
Chinese foreign policy model. As the former president Deng Xiaoping 
said: “It doesn’t matter whether the cat is black or white, as long as it 
catches mice”.
From the perspective of its rhetoric, China continues to diffuse values of 
reciprocity and harmony. During the 6th BRICS Summit, held in Fortaleza 
(Brazil) on 16th July 2014, Xi Jinping claimed that everyone should push 
together for a new world order that is more fair and rational. This new order 
should be able to guarantee the rights of the peoples to determine their 
own social system and their way to development. The need to strengthen 
global governance and demand greater attention to alternative 
international communities such as BRICS and the balance between the 
existing International Organisations and new communities was also noted. 
To empirically analyse these considerations, we will take an example of 
the relationship between China and the Latin American countries. This 
example allows us to understand the pragmatic form of governance, 
especially with respect to its bilateral relationship with the USA.
China plays in the “backyard” of the US
The Chinese presence in South America was almost absent until the 1980s, 
but since the Second World War and during the period of the Cold War 
the relationship between China and Latin America was characterized by 
a strong pragmatism. One example is the strengthening of the relationship 
between China and the dictatorship of Pinochet despite the international 
isolation of Chile in these years. It is important to note that the socialist 
Chilean government of Salvador Allende had been the first Latin American 
country to recognise the PRC, in 1970. China was also able to sign trade 
agreements with Argentina during the period of the dictatorship between 
1976 and 1983. In the 1990s its presence on the continent slowly increased 
until it reached a high level of influence under the leadership of Hu Jintao. 
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In 2014 the current Chinese leader, Xi Jinping, was in South America 
twice for official visits, demonstrating the importance of this region for 
Chinese diplomacy not only through the multilateral channel of BRICS but 
also through bilateral ties such as the launch of the China-CELAC forum 
(Community of Latin American and Caribbean States) in Beijing in January 
2015. “China will make efforts so that both sides can reap early harvests 
from the forum and build a new model of South-South cooperation”; the 
speech of the Chinese foreign Minister Wang Yi during the forum highlights 
Beijing’s growing interest in the “backyard” of the United States.
It is important to note that the relationship between the United States and 
Latin America has become “colder” in recent years and China seems to 
be an alternative partner for the countries of the region. Very recently 
there have been signs of a possible new US approach to the region, 
as suggested by the participation of Barack Obama in the Summit of 
the Americas held in Panama (April 2015), which was the occasion of 
Obama’s historical meeting with Raul Castro, President of Cuba, after the 
bilateral relationship has been at odds for more than 50 years. 
Between 1945 and 1990, the Cold War transformed Latin America to a 
space of political interest for Washington, a silent field of battle in which to 
contain possible incursions of the Soviet Union and the spread of socialism 
in the region. Political movements oriented by social ideas were reasons 
given for US intervention in Latin America.
The 1990s was the end of political conflict led by leftists and Washington’s 
approach towards Latin America changed from a political and military 
focus to an economic strategy with a pragmatic agenda of trade and 
investment based on the Washington Consensus. This political behaviour 
can be seen in some of the US’s strategic projects, such as the Enterprise 
for the Americas Initiative (EAI) that aimed to establish a free trade area 
over Latin America or the programme of debt relief and loans (1990). The 
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) signed between the USA, 
Canada and Mexico was to be an incentive for other Latin American 
countries like Mexico to join the trade initiative, however, the new 
political movement in Latin America, led by a leftist ideology representing 
nationalism, populism and criticism of US policy, started to develop in 2000 
and contributed to temporally stopping the “American Free Trade Zone 
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Dream”. The ideological and political Yankee influence continued to 
exist strongly in Latin America, especially in the Pacific Alliance countries 
(Mexico, Chile, Colombia and Peru).
Taking advantage of the distance between Latin America and the US, 
and the absence of strong external trade partners for the region, China 
started to increase its presence, generating diversity in terms of foreign 
relations for Latin America. 
As a result of the beginning of the terrorism war launched by George 
Bush after the 9/11 attacks, the disastrous wars in Afghanistan and Iraq 
and the “Pivot to Asia” strategy of Obama’s Administration, Washington 
has appeared further and further from Latin America. In this context, the 
“Pivot to Asia” strategy is an important element in the bilateral relationship 
of China and the US, because the new American policy in Asia has been 
idealised in order to contain the military and economic spread of China’s 
influence in Southeast Asia. The statement of the former Secretary of State, 
Hilary Clinton, is crucial to understanding the relevance of Asia for the US: 
“The future of politics will be decided in Asia, not Afghanistan and Iraq, 
and the United States will be right at the center of the action” (Clinton 
2011).
Chinese expansion in Latin America was not considered a challenge to 
US in its backyard. The interdependence of the two first world economic 
powers was a reason for China to sustain its pragmatic foreign policy of 
“no intervention” and “only doing business” without affronting the political 
influence of US in the region.
The neoliberal agenda promoted by the Washington Consensus hasn’t 
been able to attract the entire Latin America region. For the moment, 
China’s approach is attracting most Latin America countries, especially 
those in which the populist governments have had remarkable success. 
Countries such as Bolivia, Venezuela and Ecuador are all strengthening 
their cooperation with China and frequently accuse the USA of imposing 
an imperialist policy in the region. As stated by the Vice President of 
Venezuela, Jorge Arreaza: “China has great potential, and it is not 
imperialist. It is a great potential that wants for all of us respectable and 
dignify living standards” (Fisher Hoffman 2015).
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Dragon catches the Latin American Mice
Chinese interests in Latin America are based on a clear strategy. These 
countries supply China with natural resources such as oil (Venezuela), 
meat (Argentina), soybeans (Brazil and Argentina), and copper (Chile 
and Peru) in exchange for loans with low interest rates which could be 
considered an instrument of diplomacy and a source of profit3. This model 
of cooperation with developing countries and the internationalization 
of Chinese investments and lending were first put in place by the former 
Chinese President Jiang Zemin (1989-2002). South American leaders, 
conscious of this reality, are developing a foreign policy characterised 
by strategically flirting with China in order to attract more investment. The 
Vice President of Argentina, Amado Boudou, clearly confirmed: “Relations 
between China and Argentina will continue to grow for the benefit for 
our people (…) it is not a simple buyer or trade partner but a strategic 
partner to work together and have an egalitarian world” (Latin Post 2014), 
revealing the tendency of South American governments to use populists 
statements to sustain the new South to South development cooperation, 
and their necessity to be financially supported by China. 
The increase in trade relations between China and Latin America 
originated with the “commodity boom” between 2003 and 2008, when 
the internal Chinese capacity to produce raw materials (oil, minerals, 
foods) began to be insufficient to satisfy its wide economic development. 
This generated the development of exports from Latin American countries 
in order to supply Chinese demand. 
China has recently signed a trade agreement, for example, with Argentina, 
called “Convenio Marco de Cooperación en Materia Económica y de 
Inversiones” which will help to build infrastructure projects in the country. 
In particular the construction of two hydroelectric dams is planned in 
Patagonia with loans of US$ 4.7 billion and US$ 2.1 billion, which will be 
used to make a railroad connecting Argentina’s agricultural plants to its 
ports, for more efficient transport of grains, as China is the largest buyer of 
Argentinean soybeans.
3 In some cases, these loans are paid directly with commodities. China has already granted US$ 50 billion of credits to 
Venezuela since 2007, and a big part of this loan is paid through barrels of crude oil and derivatives which Venezuela 
sends daily to China.
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The most recent visit to Latin America of Xi Jinping (in particular, Brazil, 
Argentina, Venezuela and Cuba) was the biggest visit of a top Chinese 
leader in the region since the tour of Hu Jintao in 2004, accompanied 
by the Vice President Zeng Qinhong, and represented an important 
stage in the relationship between China and Latin America because it 
focused mainly on the signature of trade agreements and the investment 
cooperation in different sectors. During these ten years, China has been 
able to enhance its position as a strong partner for Latin American 
countries and Xi Jinping’s trip has been considered a milestone in the 
development of the relationship between the Asiatic Dragon and the 
region. Xi Jinping visited Brazil, its first trading partner of the region, to 
discuss their cooperation and the construction of a high-speed railroad 
connecting Brazil to Peru, and the Atlantic and Pacific Coasts. 
Another emblematic and ambitious engineering project is the construction 
of the Nicaragua Canal, which will also link the Atlantic and Pacific 
Oceans, promoted by a private company in Hong Kong (HKND). The 
group received the concession to build and explore the channel from 
the Nicaraguan government, headed by Sandinista Daniel Ortega, but 
it has been criticized by civil society and countries like Costa Rica for its 
environmental impact. This project would be the greatest engineering 
construction in history, and it appears to be competition for the US 
dominance of the shipping route since the building of the Panama Canal. 
Even if Beijing declares itself not involved in the project, it is obvious that 
the realisation of this infrastructure work means the reinforcement of 
China’s growing influence in the region and control of the trade route 
that could weaken the US’s historical hegemony. 
These examples demonstrate how China is engaged in the development 
of Latin American infrastructure in order to benefit its economic and 
political interests, using its pragmatic approach. 
China also launched the China-CELAC forum (Community of Latin 
American and Caribbean States) in Beijing on January 2015. “China will 
make efforts so that both sides can reap early harvests from the forum 
and build a new model of South-South cooperation”, read the speech of 
the Chinese Foreign Minister, Wang Yi, during the forum, which highlights 
Beijing’s growing interest in the backyards of the United States. Xi Jinping 
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opened the forum by announcing an amount of investment worth US$ 
250 billion in Latin America over the next decade. China also promised 
an increase of US$ 500 billion in bilateral trade, nearly double the total 
amount of 2013 (U$ 261 billion) which would consolidate the position of 
China as the second-largest trading partner of Latin America (Tiezzi 2015). 
Each year the importance of the Chinese economic presence grows 
considerably in Latin America countries. Since 2005, China has provided 
US$119 billion in loan commitments to the region, that in 2010 represented 
more than those of the World Bank, Inter-American Development Bank, 
and US Export-Import combined. In 2014, for instance, Chinese banks 
loaned more than US$22 billion to Latin America. Usually, Chinese banks 
(mainly the China Development Bank and China Ex-Im Bank which 
were both created in order to support the government’s policy) have a 
distinct target of countries to which to provide economic support such 
as Argentina, Ecuador and Venezuela which have difficulties obtaining 
loans from international financial institutions. 
The following table presents a general view of Chinese loans in Latin 
America, as updated in 2014 (The Dialogue): 
COUNTRY NUMBER OF LOANS AMOUNT
VENEZUELA 16 $ 56.3 B
BRAZIL 10 $ 22 B
ARGENTINA 10 $ 19 B
ECUADOR 12 $ 10.8 B
BAHAMAS 03 $ 2.9 B
MEXICO 03 $ 2.4 B
PERU 04 $ 2.3 B
JAMAICA 08 $ 1.4 B
BOLIVIA 03 $ 611 M
COSTA RICA 02 $ 401 M
HONDURAS 01 $ 298 M
CHILE 01 $ 150 M
GUYANA 01 $ 130 M
COLOMBIA 01 $ 75 M
URUGUAY 01 $ 10 M
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This form of cooperation is seen by some experts as a danger for Latin 
American economies because of their increasing dependence on the 
exportation of natural resources to China and the privilege of short-
term gains over of long-term uncertainty. In other words, this model of 
economic relations with China does not encourage the development of 
the industry of the region, increasing, on the contrary, its dependence on 
the exportation of its natural resources. 
China represents a competitor for Latin American countries - for example, 
the competition in manufactured goods between China and Mexico 
for the US market. The manufacturing industry represents three quarters 
of its exports and since the global expansion of Chinese manufactured 
products has increased constantly, Mexico has lost competitiveness, 
particularly in the United States market, vital for the Mexican economy. 
Another interesting example are the consequences of the already noted 
agreement between China and Argentina, regarding Brazil, according 
to which, China will be allowed to produce manufactured goods in 
Argentina that will reduce the competitive force of the Brazilian industry in 
the same sectors (Passos 2015). In 2011, nine of the twelve members of the 
Latin America Integration Association (ALADI )4 registered a trade deficit 
with China (Manriquez, Alvarez 2014). The trade relationship between 
China and the region suffers from a lack of reciprocity. Latin America 
does not, in fact, figure as one of the main trade partners of China. 
China is developing its influence in Latin America not only at a bilateral 
level but also through the multilateral channel of BRICS, confirming itself 
as the incontestable leader of the group. It has recently played a central 
role in the establishment of the New Development Bank (NDB), created in 
order to mobilise resources to finance infrastructure projects in emerging 
and developing nations5. Based in Shanghai, the NDB will have an initial 
capital of U$50 billion funded by the BRICS members. Another important 
financial initiative is the Contingency Reserve Arrangement (CRA) to 
provide liquidity to countries that have difficulties in their balance of 
4 Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Cuba, Ecuador, Mexico, Paraguay, Panama, Peru, Uruguay, Venezuela. 
5 The first article of the Agreement of the Development Bank asserts this concept: “The Bank shall mobilize resources 
for infrastructure and sustainable development projects in BRICS and other emerging economies and developing 
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payment and head off future economic crises6. In the case of the CRA, 
China is expected to participate with the biggest contribution, US$41 
billion, followed by Brazil, India and Russia with US$18 billion, and US$5 
billion from South Africa, demonstrating China’s substantial economic 
power compared to the other BRICS members. 
Actually, it is too early to predict the benefits of the actions of the NDP 
and the CRA for Latin America and how the relationship between the 
region, China and the other BRICS members will develop. For the moment, 
most of the Latin American leaders see these financial institutions as an 
opportunity for national development and the demand for modernisation 
by building a system of national infrastructure, making their ties with China 
stronger.
Despite its engagement at a multilateral level, and a sort of solidarity 
between BRICS members, the pragmatic Chinese approach and the 
prevalence of its national interest have been demonstrated on many 
occasions, such as the competition with Brazilian industry, confirming their 
approach in a globalized economy: we are together but each one of us 
is free.
China has a clear foreign policy strategy based on the diversification of 
its partners through multiple activities, according to what they can offer 
its development. Its current economic force gives China a predominant 
position among its partners, especially the peripheral regions with 
economies that depend on their natural resources.
Conclusion
The Chinese form of development is based on a strategy of diversification 
through the establishment of trade relations with multiple partners in 
different regions in order to expand economic influence.
6 The Contingence Reserve Agreement “is a framework for the provision of support trough liquidity and precautionary 
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The trade relationship between China and Latin America has some 
particularities. Chinese expansion over a zone historically submissive to 
US influence has been facilitated at least by three factors: the interest of 
Washington’s foreign policy in other regions such as the Middle East and 
Asia, its unsuccessful strategy to promote Free Trade Agreements and the 
insurgence of leftist governments which began to spread anti-American 
ideology.
Chinese foreign policy in Latin America follows a clear agenda: 
economic interests based on the trade of commodities, supply of raw 
materials and exploration of new markets for its manufactured products 
which is compatible with the ideas established in the Beijing Consensus of 
innovation, diversification and self-determination, which is generating a 
new model of cooperation from South to South.
Currently, Latin American governments find it convenient to join the 
Chinese model, because of their need to develop their infrastructure. 
The Chinese principle of “no intervention” in domestic affairs appears to 
be of more interest to these governments than the traditional model of 
political interference of Western powers. China is not concerned about 
the national issues of its trading partners, but “only doing business” which 
reflects the pragmatic Chinese way.
China has been able to create its own model of development according 
to its challenges and demands. It is not a question of evaluating whether 
this model is good or bad, fair or not, but only to demonstrate that it is 
important for Latin American countries to rethink their own social and 
economical development systems on the basis of their needs and society’s 
expectations in order to find their role in the new global order.
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